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at	all,	they	are	strongly	inferior	to	a	UK-EU	Treaty	based	solution	and	create	the	wrong	impression	that	the	five	million	will	be	properly	protected:	1) Unilateral	solutions	can	never	cover	all	aspects	of	the	rights	the	five	million	hold.		Some	of	these	require	by	definition	an	international	agreement,	such	as	ensuring	that	people	can	still	rely	on	social	security	contributions	made	and	entitlements	(such	as	pension	rights)	that	they	have	built	up	in	different	countries,	as	well	as	certain	aspects	of	cross-border	health	care	provision	which	require	international	coordination.				2) UK	citizens	in	Europe	would	depend	on	unilateral	solutions	in	27	different	countries.	While	several	countries	have	announced	they	would	take	unilateral	measures,	these	still	have	to	be	implemented	(see	below).		With	so	few	guarantees	in	place,	there	is	a	serious	risk	of	a	tit-for-tat	between	the	UK	and	EU	countries	in	downgrading	citizens’	rights.	3) Unilateral	solutions	miss	the	protection	of	international	guarantees	and	oversight	and	make	the	five	million	strongly	vulnerable	to	further	undermining	of	their	status	or	bad	implementation	practices	that	would	lead	to	individuals	failing	to	obtain	protection.			The	UK	proposals	for	unilateral	solutions	are	a	case	in	point.		The	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Act	rolls	over	EU	law	beyond	the	Brexit	date,	until	UK	law	makes	amendments	to	it.		This	appears	to	give	the	3	million	some	coverage	not	to	fall	into	legal	limbo	on	Brexit	day.		However,	on	20	December	2018,	the	Government	introduced	for	discussion	in	Parliament	the	Immigration	and	Social	Security	Co-ordination	(EU	Withdrawal)	Bill.4		That	Bill	wipes	out	all	relevant	EU	law	regarding	immigration	and	the	rights	of	the	3	million.		At	the	same	time,	it	gives	the	Government	sweeping	competences	to	deal	with	their	status	via	secondary	legislation,	with	hardly	any	intervention	by	Parliament.		This	follows	the	pattern	of	the	trial	Settled	Status	Scheme,5	which	has	been	set	out	in	secondary	legislation.				At	the	moment,	the	Bill	has	not	even	set	a	date	for	coming	into	force.		If	it	were	to	come	into	effect	on	Brexit	day	in	its	current	form,	it	would	make	all	3	million	EU	citizens	who	have	not	yet	successfully	applied	for	Settled	Status	(i.e.	nearly	all	of	them)	illegal	overnight.		Let’s	assume	the	final	version	of	the	Bill	will	only	come	into	force	at	the	end	of	the	so-called	grace	period	for	registration,	or	at	least	provide	a	mechanism	to	keep	EU	law	into	force	until	then.		Even	in	that	case,	the	position	of	EU	citizens	will	be	very	vulnerable.		The	process	to	obtain	settled	status,	and	even	much	of	the	content	of	that	status,	will	be	set	out	and	be	amendable	by	Government	intervention	with	a	limited	role	for	Parliament.		In	a	country	where	immigration	policy	is	driven	by	government	action	imposing	a	‘hostile	environment’,	perfectly	illustrated	by	the	Windrush	scandal,	this	is	a	very	worrying	prospect	for	EU	citizens.																																																																																																																																																																Brik	and	Dimitry	Kochenov	(2018),	‘A	Critical	Perspective	on	Associate	EU	Citizenship	after	Brexit’,	DCU	Brexit	Institute	-	Working	paper	N.	5	–	2018.	4	https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2017-19/immigrationandsocialsecuritycoordinationeuwithdrawal.html	5	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-settlement-scheme-statement-of-intent/eu-settlement-scheme-statement-of-intent	
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The	best	protection	for	the	five	million	is	thus	by	way	of	a	UK-EU	agreement,	rather	than	by	unilateral	solutions.			Ideally,	the	UK	and	the	EU	should	have	agreed	on	this	right	at	the	start	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	instead	of	making	it	dependent	on	other	aspects	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.				I	set	out	the	arguments	for	such	‘ring-fencing’	soon	after	the	UK	had	triggered	Article	50TEU:6			1) By	guaranteeing	these	rights	upfront,	and	reciprocally	between	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	and	UK	citizens	in	Europe,	the	issue	would	have	been	taken	from	the	negotiation	table	and	citizens	wouldn’t	have	been	a	bargaining	chip	in	other	areas	of	the	Brexit	negotiation.	2) By	adopting	and	ratifying	citizens’	rights	early	in	the	process,	their	rights	would	have	been	guaranteed	even	in	the	case	of	‘no	deal’,	namely	failure	of	agreement	on	other	aspects	of	withdrawal.	3) Early	agreement	could	have	relieved	5	million	citizens	from	unnecessary	anxiety.		However,	while	both	the	main	associations	representing	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	(t3m)	and	UK	citizens	in	Europe	(BiE)	have	repeatedly	lobbied	for	ring-fencing,	the	UK	and	EU	have	refused	to	do	this.		The	UK	Government	and	the	European	Commission	have	negotiated	a	solution	for	citizens’	rights	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.			Agreement	on	this	was	found	prior	to	more	controversial	aspects	of	the	negotiation,	particularly	the	Irish	border.		Yet,	despite	the	anxiety	of	five	million	people	uncertain	about	their	legal	status,	no	initiative	was	taken	to	adopt	these	citizens’	rights	separately	prior	to	more	contested	issues.		As	a	result,	the	fate	of	the	five	million	is	now	bound	up	with	the	fate	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	opposition	against	which	is	not	due	to	its	citizens’	rights	provisions.			So	why	have	the	UK	and	EU	not	taken	the	initiative	to	ring-fence	citizens’	rights?	For	the	UK,	the	3	million	EU	citizens	have	been	one	of	its	main	bargaining	chips,	so	it	had	little	interest	to	take	that	off	the	table.		Moreover,	its	primary	objective	has	been	to	bring	these	citizens	within	existing	UK	immigration	law	categories,	such	as	Indefinite	Leave	to	Remain,	rather	than	favouring	a	UK-EU	Treaty	based	on	reciprocity	and	the	existing	rights	derived	from	EU	law.		The	EU	has	prioritised	the	latter,	but	insisted	that	the	Article	50	negotiations	are	driven	by	the	principle	‘nothing	is	agreed	until	everything	is	agreed’.			This	is	not	a	legal	requirement	inherent	in	Article	50.		It	is	a	procedural	choice	based	on	political	premises.		The	EU	feared	that	accepting	a	separate	agreement	on	citizens’	rights	would	set	a	precedent	for	a	Brexit	negotiation	characterised	by	subsequent	sectoral	agreements	in	which	the	UK	would	have	more	scope	to	break	up	unity	amongst	the	EU27.		However,	given	that	this	is	simply	a	political	principle	that	the	EU	has	set	itself,	and	given	the	EU’s	dominant	bargaining																																																									6	Stijn	Smismans,	‘Brexit:	A	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	under	Article	50	TEU’,	EUtopialaw	blog	(16h	June	2017),	at	https://eutopialaw.com/2017/06/16/brexit-a-separate-citizens-rights-agreement-under-article-50-teu/	
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of	Justice	of	the	EU	and	the	creation	of	an	independent	monitoring	authority).	7	It	will	equally	have	to	include	a	transition	period,	which	would	not	provide	for	the	continued	application	of	all	EU	law	like	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	but	of	all	EU	law	related	to	citizens	rights	since	such	a	transition	period	is	needed	to	allow	EU	citizens	to	register	for	their	new	status.			The	best,	and	most	likely	only,	way	to	adopt	such	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	is	by	doing	it	under	Article	50.		Article	50	requires	(only)	qualified	majority	in	the	Council	and	the	consent	of	the	European	Parliament,	rather	than	unanimity	in	the	Council	and	ratification	in	all	national	parliaments	in	the	case	of	a	so-called	‘mixed	agreement’	dealing	with	topics	on	which	the	EU	shares	competences	with	the	Member	States.		In	case	one	had	to	rely	on	the	latter	it	would	be	extremely	difficult	to	get	it	in	place	by	the	Brexit	date.		Moreover,	it	is	even	uncertain	that	the	EU	would	have	the	competence	to	negotiate	outside	of	Article	50TEU	all	aspects	currently	covered	on	citizens’	rights	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		According	to	Articles	79	and	80	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU),	the	EU	can	lay	down	the	conditions	governing	entry	into	and	legal	residence	in	a	Member	State,	including	for	the	purposes	of	family	reunification,	for	third-country	nationals.		Yet,	Member	States	retain	the	right	to	determine	volumes	of	admission	for	people	coming	from	third	countries	to	seek	work.		Moreover,	the	EU	may	provide	incentives	and	support	for	measures	taken	by	Member	States	to	promote	the	integration	of	legally	resident	third-country	nationals,	but	EU	law	makes	no	provision	for	the	harmonisation	of	national	laws	and	regulations	on	this	matter.				Hence,	unless	acting	under	Article	50TEU,	which	provides	a	wide	horizontal	power	for	the	EU	to	settle	‘withdrawal’,	it	is	highly	unlikely	the	EU	could	negotiate	a	treaty	(even	a	mixed	one)	with	a	third	country	that	gives	third	country	nationals	a	comprehensive	package	of	rights	that	comes	close	to	the	set	of	rights	of	EU	citizenship.			Particularly	as	Member	States	are	very	protective	of	their	sovereignty	these	days	in	terms	of	controlling	immigration,	it	is	unlikely	they	will	leave	the	EU	much	space	to	act	on	this	if	it	stretches	competences	under	Article	79	and	80	TFEU.		Yet,	while	Member	States	have	agreed	that	the	EU	has	the	wider	horizontal	competence	to	deal	with	all	these	rights	in	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	two	questions	may	arise	regarding	the	possibility	to	adopt	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	under	Article	50.		 1) According	to	Article	50	the	Union	shall	negotiate	and	conclude	an	agreement	with	that	withdrawing	State,	setting	out	the	arrangements	for	its	withdrawal.				Can	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	be	that	agreement?		The	European	Council	has	set	out	is	expectations	of	what	a	withdrawal	agreement	would	cover,	including	citizens’	rights,	the	budget,	Northern																																																									7	On	the	limitations	of	this	Independent	Authority	as	provided	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	see	Stijn	Smismans,	‘EU	citizens	in	the	UK	are	in	a	particularly	weak	position	and	need	an	independent	authority	to	monitor	their	rights’,	LSE	Brexit	Blog	(21st	April	2018),	at	http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/eu-citizens-in-the-uk-are-in-a-particularly-weak-position-and-need-an-independent-authority-to-monitor-their-rights/	
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Ireland,	and	institutional	issues	such	as	moving	EU	agencies	based	in	the	UK.		However,	these	were	political	objectives	set	out	at	the	start	of	the	negotiation.		There	is	no	legal	obligation	under	Article	50	that	all	these	aspects	have	to	be	covered	in	the	withdrawal	agreement.	A	political	decision	can	equally	be	taken	that	citizens’	rights	constitute	the	only	area	on	which	agreement	could	be	found	to	govern	the	UK’s	exit	from	the	EU	under	Article	50.		In	that	scenario,	the	rest	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	fails	to	be	adopted	and	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	constitutes	de	facto	the	only	withdrawal	agreement	under	Article	50.		2) The	second	question	is	whether	more	than	one	agreement	can	be	adopted	under	Article	50.		This	question	seems	more	pertinent	if	ring-fencing	would	have	been	done	at	the	start	of	the	negotiation	process.			With	two	months	left	to	the	Brexit	date,	it	is	highly	unlikely	one	would	first	sign	a	citizens’	rights	agreement,	and	then	still	land	on	a	second	agreement	on	remaining	issues	prior	to	the	Brexit	date.		More	likely	one	has	to	conclude	that	the	full	Withdrawal	Agreement	has	failed,	and	then	adopt	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	as	the	only	agreement	under	Article	50.			However,	the	question	remains	relevant	for	two	reasons.			Some	policy-makers	keep	pushing	back	the	request	for	ring-fencing	with	the	argument	that	the	full	Withdrawal	Agreement	needs	to	be	given	all	chances	to	get	adopted.		Adopting	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	now	is	seen	as	counterproductive	to	that,	as	some	believe	that	would	constitute	the	end	of	negotiations.		Yet,	pushing	the	adoption	of	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	backward	until	the	eve	of	Brexit	is	risky,	as	it	might	be	too	late	to	ratify	it	in	time.		To	avoid	this	risk	it	is	useful	to	know	that	the	signature	of	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	now	does	not	exclude	agreement	on	other	issues	later.		If	one	can	adopt	more	than	one	agreement	under	Article	50,	the	argument	for	ever	pushing	back	adopting	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	becomes	less	convincing.8	Moreover,	the	issue	remains	particularly	relevant	given	that	Article	50	might	be	extended.			It	is	highly	unlikely	the	UK	can	sort	out	its	position	prior	to	29th	March,	and	the	amendment	currently	proposed	in	Parliament	by	Yvette	Cooper	would	exactly	make	a	request	for	an	Article	50	extension	the	UK’s	default	position	to	avoid	(temporary)	no-deal,	although	it	would	not	guarantee	the	EU	will	grant	such	extension.			Even	in	the	case	of	extension,	it	remains	highly	desirable	to	adopt	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	now.	It	is	unreasonable	and	not	acceptable	to	imagine	5	million	citizens,	already	uncertain	about	their	legal	status,	waiting	on	the	eve	of	Brexit	to	see	whether	the	UK	requests	and	the	EU	grants	an	extension,	while	that	extension,	after	renewed	negotiation,	a	general	election	or	a	referendum	might	still	result	in	a	no	deal.		It	is	time	to	safeguard	the	rights	of	5	million	people	now,	as	has	been	promised	by	all	parties	(even	on	the	Leave	campaign)	ever	since	the	referendum.	So,	can	more	than	one	agreement	be	adopted	under	Article	50?	Although	Article	50	refers	to	a	‘withdrawal	agreement’	in	the	singular,	interpreting	the	singular	in	the	plural	(and	vice	versa)	is	not	an	unusual	legal	interpretation	technique.		In	some	jurisdictions,	this	option	is	even	set	out	as	a	general	interpretation	rule	by																																																									8	On	the	political	dynamics	of	this	argument	see	below.		








 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324156 
	 10	
such	as	the	coordination	of	social	security	issues.11			The	challenges	of	getting	in	place	27	unilateral	solutions	in	order	to	ensure	the	protection	of	the	British	citizens	in	the	EU	has	led	to	calls	for	a	European	wide	initiative	to	cover	their	situation.12		However,	efforts	in	this	direction	immediately	encounter	resistance	in	terms	of	whether	the	EU	has	the	legal	competence	to	act.		As	discussed	above,	Member	States	are	reluctant	to	give	the	EU	much	space	to	act	under	Article	79	and	80TFEU,	and	in	this	particular	case	resistance	appears	that	strong	that	currently	one	would	only	contemplate	that	the	EU	adopts	recommendations	and	not	binding	action.			Whatever	the	difficulties	with	unilateral	action,	or	an	EU	wide	solution	for	the	British	citizens	in	all	27	EU	countries,		the	further	elaboration	of	such	measures	may	make	the	adoption	of	a	citizens’	rights	agreement		more	unlikely.		The	more	Member	States	have	invested	in	setting	up	these	solutions	and	the	more	they	have	asserted	sovereignty	over	it,	the	more	they	will	argue	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	is	no	longer	needed,	although,	as	analysed	above,	such	unilateral	agreements	can	never	provide	the	same	protection	(even	if	they	were	put	in	place	in	time).		It	is	the	time	now	for	political	actors	to	take	up	their	responsibility.		It	would	be	outrageous	if	the	EU	were	to	abandon	its	citizens	and	former	citizens	and	leave	their	fate	to	unilateral	national	solutions.		Five	million	citizens	have	built	their	lives	on	their	trust	in	European	citizenship.		For	the	EU	not	to	do	its	utmost	to	protect	them	is	an	abdication	of	its	role	and	key	raison	d’être.			Also	the	UK	has	little	reason	not	to	do	the	right	thing.		The	UK	has	already	been	willing	to	adopt	a	citizens’	agreement	with	Switzerland,	independent	of	future	trade	relationships,	although	these	unavoidably	need	to	be	renegotiated	too.	So	why	would	the	UK	government	still	refuse	a	separate	citizens	rights	agreement	with	the	EU27?			Moreover,	agreeing	now	might	also	create	goodwill	in	further	negotiations,	whether	in	the	context	of	asking	for	an	extension	of	Article	50,	or	in	the	unavoidable	negotiations	to	take	place	after	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.		Technically,	there	are	two	ways	to	act	on	ring-fencing	now:	1) The	UK	and	the	EU	adopt	immediately	a	joint	political	statement	in	which	they	commit	that	the	citizens’	rights	part	of	the	WA	will	be	adopted,	ratified	and	implemented	prior	to	the	Brexit	date,	even	in	case	of	failure	to	agree	a		full	withdrawal	agreement.	However,	there	is	a	risk	that	a	mere	joint	political	statement	would	not	be	respected	or	not	implemented	in	time,	particularly	in	a	situation	when	no	deal	takes	place	in	a	climate	of	full	political	chaos	as	well	as	potential	increased	hostility	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.																																																											11	In	the	context	of	the	no	deal	contingency	planning,	the	EU27	have	been	told	by	the	European	Commission	they	should	not	enter	into	any	deals	on	topics	covered	by	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.		It	is	thus	impossible	the	27	bilateral	treaties	would	be	in	place	in	time.				12	All	British	Members	of	the	European	Parliament	signed	a	letter	in	this	regard	in	January	2019.	
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2) 	Hence,	the	best	way	to	secure	citizens’	rights	is	adopting	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	right	now,	so	the	UK	and	EU	can	ensure	implementation	by	Brexit	day.		It	will	come	into	force	on	Brexit	day,	whether	that	is	29th	March	or	the	end	of	a	period	of	extension.		A	clause	in	the	agreement	itself,	or	a	declaration	by	the	EU	and	the	UK,	can	clarify	that	this	agreement	will	be	the	sole	Article	50	agreement	in	the	case	of	failure	to	agree	on	other	topics	by	Brexit	day,	but	that	its	signature	does	not	preclude	the	adoption	of	other	agreements	under	Article	50	prior	to	Brexit	day.								
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